LIBRO USADO. RECUERDA QUE EL 10% DE ESTA VENTA COLABORA CON FUNDACIONES QUE FOMENTAN LA LECTURA EN ZONAS VULNERABLES. It seems to me that there are three overriding issues that need to be discussed when considering the monetary meltdown of 2008. Those questions are: !. What caused the markets to fail? 2: Was government's response to the failure effective? 3. How can future failures be prevented? In "Stress Test", Timothy Geithner sort of addresses all three questions. In his view, a long period of overconfidence about the housing market's ability to deal with risk led to "mania". New and exotic "derivative" security instruments built out of mortgages that had been "sliced and diced" beyond recognition, and then "insured" against any possible loss by AIG gave investors, lenders and regulators a false sense that risk had somehow been eliminated from the mortgage business. As President of the most important regulatory agency in banking, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 2003-2009, he downplays his role in encouraging this "manic" period, saying that he was concerned about increasing risk and said so, but his concerns were largely ignored; and since he was only a regulator, and the banks he regulated (like CitiGroup and Chase) were not major players in home mortgages, what else could he do? Right. When I opened the book, I hoped this well-placed guy who was present for the constant regulatory projections that markets were healthy and would continue to grow would provide insight as to how the regulators could have jumped on the lending bandwagon in such a big way; but he doesn't. He does comment that there are too many regulators regulating overlapping industries, and hints that regulators are too close to the industries for which they are responsible, but, beyond that, Geithner seems to be at a loss.